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1.
psyarxiv; 2022.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.58udn

ABSTRACT

Social and behavioral science research proliferated during the COVID-19 pandemic, reflecting the substantial increase in influence of behavioral science in public health and public policy more broadly. This review presents a comprehensive assessment of 742 scientific articles on human behavior during COVID-19. Two independent teams evaluated 19 substantive policy recommendations (“claims”) on potentially critical aspects of behaviors during the pandemic drawn from the most widely cited behavioral science papers on COVID-19. Teams were made up of original authors and an independent team, all of whom were blinded to other team member reviews throughout. Both teams found evidence in support of 16 of the claims; for two claims, teams found only null evidence; and for no claims did the teams find evidence of effects in the opposite direction. One claim had no evidence available to assess. Seemingly due to the risks of the pandemic, most studies were limited to surveys, highlighting a need for more investment in field research and behavioral validation studies. The strongest findings indicate interventions that combat misinformation and polarization, and to utilize effective forms of messaging that engage trusted leaders and emphasize positive social norms.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
2.
psyarxiv; 2022.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.j3w7d

ABSTRACT

Humans have the capacity, but perhaps not always the willingness, for great intelligence. From global warming to the spread of misinformation and beyond, our species is facing several major challenges that are the result of the limits of our own reasoning and decision-making. So, why are we so prone to errors during reasoning? In this chapter, I will outline a framework for understanding reasoning errors that is based on a three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement (intuition, metacognition, and reason). The model has two key implications: 1) That a mere lack of deliberation and analytic thinking is a primary source of errors and 2) That when deliberation is activated, it generally reduces errors (via questioning intuitions and integrating new information) than increasing errors (via rationalization and motivated reasoning). In support of these claims, I review research showing the extensive predictive validity of measures that index individual differences in analytic cognitive style – even beyond explicit errors per se. In particular, analytic thinking is not only predictive of skepticism about a wide range of epistemically suspect beliefs (paranormal, conspiratorial, COVID-19 misperceptions, pseudoscience and alternative medicines) as well as decreased susceptibility to bullshit, fake news, and misinformation, but also important differences in people’s moral judgments and values as well as their religious beliefs (and disbeliefs). Furthermore, in some (but not all cases), there is evidence from experimental paradigms that support a causal role of analytic thinking in determining judgments, beliefs, and behaviors. The findings reviewed here provide some reason for optimism for the future: It may be possible to foster analytic thinking and therefore improve the quality of our decisions.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
4.
psyarxiv; 2021.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.q4bd2

ABSTRACT

There is widespread concern about fake news and other misinformation circulating on social media. In particular, many argue that the context of social media itself may make people particularly susceptible to the influence of false claims. Here, we test that claim by asking whether simply considering whether to share news on social media reduces people’s ability to identify truth versus falsehood. In a large online experiment (N=3,157 Americans quota-matched to the national distribution of age, gender, ethnicity, and geographic region) examining COVID-19 and political news, we find support for this possibility. Compared to a baseline where participants judged only the accuracy of each headline, we observed worse truth discernment when participants also indicated their sharing intentions. Conversely, sharing discernment was substantially higher when participants also rated accuracy, relative to a baseline where sharing intentions were elicited without rating accuracy. These results suggest people may be particularly vulnerable to believing false claims on social media due to fundamental features of these platforms – which is particularly concerning given that it is hard to imagine social media without sharing.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
5.
psyarxiv; 2021.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.v8ruj

ABSTRACT

Interventions that shift users attention toward the concept of accuracy represent a promising approach for reducing misinformation sharing online. We assess the replicability and generalizability of this accuracy prompt effect by meta-analyzing 20 experiments (with a total N = 26,863) completed by our group between 2017 and 2020. This internal meta-analysis includes all relevant studies regardless of outcome and uses identical analyses across all studies. Overall, accuracy prompts increased the quality of news that people share (sharing discernment) relative to control, primarily by reducing sharing intentions for false headlines by 10% relative to control in these studies. The magnitude of the effect did not significantly differ by content of headlines (politics compared with COVID-19 related news) and did not significantly decay over successive trials. The effect was not robustly moderated by gender, race, political ideology, education, or value explicitly placed on accuracy, but was significantly larger for older, more reflective, and more attentive participants. This internal meta-analysis demonstrates the replicability and generalizability of the accuracy prompt effect on sharing discernment.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
6.
psyarxiv; 2021.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.r3vem

ABSTRACT

COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy among Black Americans threatens to further magnify racial inequities in COVID-19 related health outcomes that emerged in the earliest stages of the pandemic. Here we shed new light on attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccines by considering intragroup variation. Rather than analyzing Blacks as a homogenous group, we examine the relationship between COVID-19 vaccine attitudes and the extent to which participants are aligned with African American versus White culture (i.e., level of “acculturation”). In a sample of N=997 Black Americans, we find that stronger alignment with African American culture predicts substantially more negative attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccination, above and beyond variation explained by age, gender, education, and socioeconomic status. This relationship was substantially attenuated when controlling for suspicion of the healthcare system, but not perceptions that healthcare system treats Blacks unfairly, science knowledge, or cognitive reflection. The intragroup differences among Blacks in COVID-19 vaccine perceptions uncovered here provide insights into designing interventions that provide health information that targets the relevant factors for vaccine hesitancy in differing subgroups.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
7.
psyarxiv; 2021.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.r5wez

ABSTRACT

A common claim is that people vary not just in what they think, but how they think. Although there are a number of measures that have been developed to index intuitive versus analytic thinking, it is unclear if people primarily vary along a single dimension (from intuitive to analytic) or whether there are genuinely different types of thinking styles. We distinguish between four distinct types of thinking styles using a 4-Component Thinking Styles Questionnaire (4-CTSQ): Actively Open-minded Thinking, Close-minded Thinking, Preference for Intuitive Thinking, and Preference for Effortful Thinking. We discovered strong predictive validity across several outcome measures (e.g., epistemically suspect beliefs, bullshit receptivity, empathy, moral judgments, among others), with some subscales having stronger predictive validity for some outcomes but not others. In a study with nationally representative samples in the U.S. and Canada, we found that Actively Open-minded Thinking, in particular, strongly outperformed the Cognitive Reflection Test (a popular behavioral measure of thinking styles) in predicting misperceptions about COVID-19, the ability to discern between vaccination-related true and false news, and (more weakly) both COVID-19 vaccination intentions and attitudes. Our results indicate that people do, in fact, differ along multiple dimension of intuitive-analytic thinking styles and that these dimensions have consequences for understanding a wide range of beliefs and behaviors.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
8.
psyarxiv; 2021.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.sjfbn

ABSTRACT

Recent research suggests that shifting users’ attention to accuracy increases the quality of news they subsequently share online. Here we help develop this initial observation into a suite of deployable interventions for practitioners. We ask (i) how prior results generalize to other approaches for prompting users to consider accuracy, and (ii) for whom these prompts are more versus less effective. In a large survey experiment examining participants’ intentions to share true and false headlines about COVID-19, we identify a variety of different accuracy prompts that successfully increase sharing discernment across a wide range of demographic subgroups while maintaining user autonomy. Research questions•There is mounting evidence that inattention to accuracy plays an important role in the spread of misinformation online. Here we examine the utility of a suite of different accuracy prompts aimed at increasing the quality of news shared by social media users.•Which approaches to shifting attention towards accuracy are most effective? •Does the effectiveness of the accuracy prompts vary based on social media user characteristics? Assessing effectiveness across subgroups is practically important for examining the generalizability of the treatments, and is theoretically important for exploring the underlying mechanism.Essay summary•Using survey experiments with N=9,070 American social media users (quota-matched to the national distribution on age, gender, ethnicity, and geographic region), we compared the effect of different treatments designed to induce people to think about accuracy when deciding what news to share. Participants received one of the treatments (or were assigned to a control condition), and then indicated how likely they would be to share a series of true and false news posts about COVID-19. •We identified three lightweight, easily-implementable approaches that each increased sharing discernment (the quality of news shared, measured as the difference in sharing probability of true versus false headlines) by roughly 50%, and a slightly more lengthy approach that increased sharing discernment by close to 100%. We also found that another approach that seemed promising ex ante (descriptive norms) was ineffective. Further-more, gender, race, partisanship, and concern about COVID-19 did not moderate effectiveness, suggesting that the accuracy prompts will be effective for a wide range of demographic subgroups. Finally, helping to illuminate the mechanism behind the effect, the prompts were more effective for participants who were more attentive, reflective, engaged with COVID-related news, concerned about accuracy, college-educated, and middle-aged. •From a practical perspective, our results suggest a menu of accuracy prompts that are effective in our experimental setting and that technology companies could consider testing on their own services.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
9.
psyarxiv; 2020.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.g69ha

ABSTRACT

Coincident with the global rise in concern about the spread of misinformation on social media, there has been influx of behavioral research on so-called “fake news” (fabricated or false news headlines that are presented as if legitimate) and other forms of misinformation. These studies often present participants with news content that varies on relevant dimensions (e.g., true v. false, politically consistent v. inconsistent, etc.) and ask participants to make judgments (e.g., accuracy) or choices (e.g., whether they would share it on social media). This guide is intended to help researchers navigate the unique challenges that come with this type of research. Principle among these issues is that the nature of news content that is being spread on social media (whether it is false, misleading, or true) is a moving target that reflects current affairs in the context of interest. Steps are required if one wishes to present stimuli that allow generalization from the study to the real-world phenomenon of online misinformation. Furthermore, the selection of content to include can be highly consequential for the study’s outcome, and researcher biases can easily result in biases in a stimulus set. As such, we advocate for pretesting materials and, to this end, report our own pretest of 225 recent true and false news headlines, both relating to U.S. political issues and the COVID-19 pandemic. These headlines may be of use in the short term, but, more importantly, the pretest is intended to serve as an example of best practices in a quickly evolving area of research.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
10.
psyarxiv; 2020.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.zhjkp

ABSTRACT

What are the psychological consequences of the increasingly politicized nature of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States relative to similar Western countries? In a two-wave study completed early (March) and later (December) in the pandemic, we found that polarization was greater in the U.S. (N=1,339) than in Canada (N=644) and the U.K. (N=1,283). Political conservatism in the U.S. was strongly associated with engaging in weaker mitigation behaviors, lower COVID-19 risk perceptions, greater misperceptions, and stronger vaccination hesitancy. Although there was some evidence that cognitive sophistication was associated with increased polarization in the U.S. in December (but not March), cognitive sophistication was nonetheless consistently negatively correlated with misperceptions and vaccination hesitancy across time, countries, and party lines. Furthermore, COVID-19 skepticism in the U.S. was strongly correlated with distrust in liberal-leaning mainstream news outlets and trust in conservative-leaning news outlets, suggesting that polarization may be driven by differences in information environments.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
11.
psyarxiv; 2020.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.y38m9

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic represents a massive global health crisis. Because the crisis requires large-scale behaviour change and places significant psychological burdens on individuals, insights from the social and behavioural sciences can be used to help align human behavior with the recommendations of epidemiologists and public health experts. Here we discuss evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to pandemics, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping. In each section, we note the nature and quality of prior research, including uncertainty and unsettled issues. We identify several insights for effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and also highlight important gaps researchers should move quickly to fill in the coming weeks and months.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
12.
psyarxiv; 2020.
Preprint in English | PREPRINT-PSYARXIV | ID: ppzbmed-10.31234.osf.io.uhbk9

ABSTRACT

Across two studies with over 1,600 U.S. adults recruited online, we present evidence that people share false claims about COVID-19 partly because they simply fail to think sufficiently about whether or not content is accurate when deciding what to share. In Study 1, participants were far worse at discerning between true and false content when deciding what they would share on social media relative to when they are asked directly about accuracy. Furthermore, cognitive reflection and science knowledge were associated with stronger discernment. In Study 2, we found that a simple accuracy reminder at the beginning of the study – i.e., judging the accuracy of a non-COVID-19-related headline – more than doubled the level of truth discernment in participants’ sharing intentions. Our results, which mirror those found previously for political fake news, suggest that nudging people to think about accuracy is a simple way to improve choices about what to share on social media.


Subject(s)
COVID-19
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